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Abstract
This paper develops direct tests for evaluating the performance of two types of emergency
employment programs put in place in Chile since 1999. Our results suggest: First, decen-
tralized and “market-driven” programs (subsidies for hiring and training) are more e¢cient
in terms of productivity, but are targeted to people that are less vulnerable to unemploy-
ment. Second, direct employment programs result in moderate increases of the income of the
households of the participants. This increase may be outweighted by the costs (in present
value) associated with higher school drop-out and participation rates. Third, if analyzed at
a municipality level (comuna), centralized programs do not target municipalities with higher
unemployment, increased vulnerability to unemployment, or even lower median income lev-
els, but are strongly correlated with the political a¢liation of its major. Finally, our results
suggest that the population targeted in direct employment programs is not more vulnerable
to unemployment than the actually unemployed.
Key Words: Employment Programs, Targeting, Propensity Score Matching, Chile.
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1 Introduction
Emergency employment programs (EEPs) are tools aimed at lessening the e¤ects of the
economic crisis on consumption and human wealth accumulation (Maloney, 2001). However,
most EEPs’ practical experiences show that their objectives and target populations are not
clearly de…ned. Furthermore, these programs are only one way of alleviating the consequences
of the drop in income and consumption in the face of a crisis, and are not conceived as a
way of structurally approaching the problem of poverty and exclusion.1
Chile’s experience with EEPs began in the crisis of 1982 when the unemployment rate
exceeded 20%. It was innovative and, to a certain extent, pioneering in matters of design and
ex-post evaluation. These programs and other more recent experiences in Latin America,
taught lessons on how a bad design can induce people who do not belong to the target
population to participate in them. More precisely, the Chilean experience with EEPs showed
that di¤erences in design, in entry requirements, and in wages paid, severely a¤ected the
targeted groups and results.
The strong criticism wielded against EEPs and the lesser need to implement them
prompted, in 1986, to discard them. However, this situation changed towards the end of
1998, when the unemployment rate measured by the University of Chile jumped from 6.9%
in June 1998 to 11.1% in September of the same year. The problem worsened in the year
1For a more exhaustive battery of programs, see for example, Khadiagala (1995), Lustig (1997) Klugman
(1999) and Wodon and Hicks (2002).
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2000, when the open unemployment was close to 15%, and the percentage of those who had
been unemployed for more than 6 months reached 43%.
One of the most striking aspects of the labor markets diagnosis is that even though Chile
had overcome the world economic crisis relatively well, and that GDP grew at about 3% per
annum between 1998 and 2002, according to the National Bureau of Statistics (INE), this
was not associated with increases in employment. Di¤erent answers have been put forth to
solve this riddle. Even though many diagnoses could explain the increased and persistent
unemployment, few of them called for the implementation of EEPs.2
If the nature of the economic crisis were understood by the policy maker, a clear pro…le
of the most a¤ected could be made, and if necessary, policies designed. In 1999, without a
clear diagnosis of the nature of the crisis, the government launched several EEPs, that had
di¤erent designs and resources involved. Their importance was such that by October 2002,
the ratio of bene…ciaries to the unemployed reached almost 30%.3
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate and compare the performance of the two main
types of EEPs initiated in Chile by the end of the 1990s. One is based on direct employ-
ment provided by municipalities (comunas) and the other subsidizes private sector hiring.4
The paper has three sections besides this introduction. Section 2 brie‡y describes the pro-
2For instance, Bergoeing and Morandé (2002) suggest that increases in the minimum wage and several
proposals for labor reform played an important role in increasing the unemployment. Meanwhile, Chumacero
(2000) and Paredes (2001) focus on the methodology to estimate unemployment and provide explanations
that are more consistent with macroeconomic factors underlying the increased unemployment.
3Despite this huge increase in the number of bene…ciaries of EEPs, the unemployment rate has remained
virtually unchanged.
4Chumacero and Paredes (2002) present a more detailed and less technical description of the programs.
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grams and their expected impacts. Section 3 provides an empirical evaluation of the EEPs
considered. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2 The Programs
The EEPs initiated in the crisis of 1982 reached their peak in the mid-eighties, presenting
high heterogeneity of results in terms of targeting and ended in 1986. Public employment pro-
grams resurfaced timidly in 1992, when the new democratic government initiated a program
of employment generation through municipal placement o¢ces and which, it was argued,
was an experience quite di¤erent from the previous one. At any rate, it did not employ more
than 5,000 people.
As a direct consequence of the increased unemployment in September 1998, a fresh im-
pulse to employment programs took place in April 1999. As discussed above, in designing
the programs, a diagnosis of the nature of the crisis is not present in the o¢cial documents,
but the proximity of the presidential election, helped the government of the period to en-
courage them. Thus, President Frei’s government launched an employment program in April
1999 that began with a system of direct employment through municipalities with slightly
more than 10,000 jobs, and reached its peak in November 1999, when this program exceeded
100,000 participants (Figure 1).
Once the governing coalition was reelected in the year 2000, the new government dras-
tically reduced the employment programs to a point that, according to o¢cial information,
3
040000
80000
120000
160000
200000
99:07 00:01 00:07 01:01 01:07 02:01 02:07
Figure 1: Bene…ciaries of EEPs: 1999-2002
in December 2000 it did not exceed 15,000 jobs.5 In the year 2001, a new qualitative and
quantitative change was in place, when the government promoted a new system of programs:
subsidizing hiring. EEPs reached 155,000 bene…ciaries in October 2001 and reached a new
peak of 164,000 jobs one year later.
2.1 Design and Objectives
Since 1999, following a trend that, in part, is a consequence of looking for a more suitable
design, but which also re‡ects the absence of clarity, at least nine employment programs
were developed in Chile, each with di¤erent designs and institution in charge. Broadly
speaking, the programs may be classi…ed under the categories of direct employment (through
5However, according to the CASEN survey, in November 2000, more than 54,000 people reported them-
selves as bene…ciaries of such programs.
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municipalities), programs subsidizing private sector hiring, and a mixture of both, using
subsidies and a centralized allocation of resources.
2.1.1 Direct Employment Programs
The set of direct employment programs (e.g., the Program of Labor and Employment Rein-
sertion) states prioritizing the incorporation of unemployed in municipal districts that feature
especially high unemployment. These programs share the characteristic that hiring is made
by a public institution (municipal or central) and focuses on providing social or public in-
frastructure. Operationally, the targeted population of the programs are sought through the
o¢cial unemployment information (INE), on the basis of the last moving quarter available.
2.1.2 Subsidy to New Hiring
The subsidy program is conceived as means to facilitate hiring unemployed workers, prefer-
ably household heads, who attest to be the only source of family income. The program
subsidizes …rms with up to 40% of the monthly minimum wage of the salary paid to workers
for a period of up to four months (with hiring lasting at least four months). The worker’s
salary cannot be lower than the monthly minimumwage (approximately US$ 150 per month).
The program also …nances training costs of up to Ch$ 50,000 (US$ 73) per apprentice worker,
which are reimbursed only once, when the company certi…es having completed and paid for
the learning process to a registered …rm in the central training o¢ce.
The process of allocation is by contest, in which the best work o¤ers submitted are
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privileged. As from the year 2000, among the election factors, the program privileges small
and medium sized companies. More speci…cally, the contests establish that only …rms that
pay taxes and make social security payments are eligible. For small and medium sized
companies (with invoice of less than US$ 0.5 million dollars per year) as well as for new
companies, the maximum number of workers to be subsidized is limited to up to 6. In the
case of larger companies, they may hire up to 20% of the permanent head-count during the
previous 12 months.6 The greater the length of the contracts (with a minimum is 4 months),
the greater the salary o¤ered Over the minimum wage), are a criteria of election, but the
. Likewise, over the minimum wage agreed on, and if the bene…ciaries are unemployed
registered with the municipal placement o¢ce, are all criteria that favor granting a subsidy.
A mixture of both direct employments and subsidy programs is FOSIS. This is a cen-
tralized institution which proposes the Regional Governors to allocate more resources to
municipalities having the highest unemployment rates, identi…es …rms or municipalities that
would hire workers, and also provides a subsidy for hiring.
In addition to the di¤erent ways to select applicants and the wages they are paid, both
lines of programs di¤er in two other dimensions: First, direct employment programs select
candidates directly from municipalities while in the subsidy program they induce private
…rms to increase their level of employment. Second, the capacity to monitor and enforce the
ful…llment of the designs di¤er; a program that subsidizes new hiring by private …rms should
6When a company’s life is shorter, the head-count considers the people employed during the period of
operation.
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also monitor if the …rm is actually hiring new candidates or simply formalizing already hired
workers. The latter is particularly important as the incentives of the companies and workers,
depending on the amounts involved and the monitoring, may lead to serious distortions of
the data. Even when a subsidy that reduces the cost for new hiring will encourage additional
employment, to the extent that it is not possible to accurately keep track of who are new
workers, …rms may try to deceive the system and receive a subsidy for all of them. If it is
not possible to deceive the system with the workers already employed, there is an incentive
to arti…cially create new employment, without this being the case. Such incentive, which is
magni…ed when the …rms are not adjusted to their optimum level of employment, arises if
the subsidy is higher than the taxes that must be paid.7
2.2 What to Expect from Each Program
Here we derive several empirical implications that the design of each type of employment
program should have on the kind of participants it attracts.
Let w denote a wage o¤er and ai be a variable that re‡ects individual’s i marketable
skills.8 The individual decides to take an o¤er (si = 1) if the wage o¤er exceeds his reservation
7In the case of Chile, taxes associated with health and social security are considerably lower than the
subsidy, and therefore monitoring is crucial.
8Here a is de…ned broadly. In the next section we discuss the particular way in which it is measured in
this study.
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wage c (¢) (which is an increasing function of a). More compactly, we have that:
si =
8><>>:
1 if w ¸ c (ai)
0 otherwise.
On the other hand, given a wage rate w, a …rm would choose to make an o¤er to an
individual if his productivity exceeds w. If productivity, p (¢), is increasing in a, and a is
observable by the …rm, it places an o¤er if:
di =
8>><>>:
1 if w · p (ai)
0 otherwise.
In equilibrium, given a wage rate w there is a level of a consistent with it,
a = c¡1 (w) = p¡1 (w) : (1)
Thus, if supply and demand were to freely determine the level of marketable skills that
is consistent with a given wage, the reservation wage and the productivity functions would
determine a level of a with zero excess demand.
This is (theoretically) the characteristic of the employment program based on direct
subsidies given that if the skills of the individuals are well estimated by the …rms, they will
hire candidates whose productivity at least compensates the wage o¤er.
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On the other hand, direct employment programs are not intended to deal with the demand
of labor directly linked with productivity. It generally operates as a system in which, for a
given budget and wage rate, the individuals interested in working, will. In such case, the only
function that operates is the one that concerns the supply of labor by individuals. Thus for
a given wage w, the individuals that will work on the program will satisfy that w ¸ c (ai).
But if a = c¡1 (w) and c (¢) is an increasing function of a, then, for the same wage rate,
the level of a of the participants of subsidy programs must exceed the average of a for the
participants of direct employment programs.
This simple structure shows that from the get go, direct employment programs should
attract, on average, individuals of lower reservation wage and lower productivity than par-
ticipants of subsidy programs. Furthermore, for the same wage rate, the average individual
that participates on direct employment programs would not be hired in subsidy programs.
There are several empirical implications that can be drawn from these observations: First,
participants of subsidy programs should posses higher levels of marketable skills. Second,
direct employment programs should attract individuals that, in the absence of the program,
would not have participated in the labor market. This is so because …rms would not have
made an o¤er to the typical applicant for direct employment programs. Third, given that
on average, employees of subsidy programs should have better quali…cations than employees
of direct employment programs, the former should (on average) be less vulnerable to un-
employment, while the latter should be more prone towards sharing the characteristics of
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otherwise inactive population (people out of the labor force). The following section evaluates
the empirical support for these and other regularities that should be observed on the data.
3 Empirical Evaluation
This section presents an empirical evaluation of the employment programs put in place by
the government since 1999. To do so we rely on three sources of information: First, the
CASEN (Socio Economic National Survey) survey of the year 2000 elicited information of
the employed population asking if their were employed by any of the direct employment
programs. Roughly 0.1% of the employed population (54,244 persons) answered a¢rma-
tively. The advantage of having this information is that CASEN is rich in information of
the characteristics of the individuals and households. Nevertheless, due to its timing, the
survey has information only of individuals that participated in direct employment programs
and not subsidy programs which were not in place at the time. A second data base provided
by FOSIS has information of the bene…ciaries of their programs up to the year 2002 (18,557
bene…ciaries). This database has information on some characteristics of the bene…ciaries
(wage, age, gender, and schooling) but does not have information of the household or the
speci…c type of employment in the program. Finally, a third database consists on information
of the bene…ciaries of the subsidy program in the year 2002 (56,290 bene…ciaries). It also
contains information of some personal characteristics, but as FOSIS it lacks of information
of the household.
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We use these databases and consider three dimensions for evaluating the performance of
the di¤erent employment programs. First, we evaluate whether the bene…ciaries of direct
employment and subsidy programs come from di¤erent populations in terms of marketable
skills and vulnerability to unemployment. Second, we quantify the e¤ects of direct employ-
ment programs on variables such as the income of households, participation rates, and school
drop-outs. Finally, we evaluate whether or not the objective of focusing on municipalities
with high unemployment rates was achieved by any of the programs.
3.1 Characteristics of the Bene…ciaries
One of the empirical implications that can be derived from the characteristics of each of the
employment programs described on Section 2, is that the bene…ciaries of direct employment
programs should (on average) have lower reservation wages than bene…ciaries of programs
based on subsidies. This is so because, given the level of salaries o¤ered by these programs,
if a …rm were to hire an individual using the subsidy program, it would only do so if the
characteristics of the candidate are such that its productivity is at least equivalent to the
wage o¤er. As the direct employment programs do not take this factor under consideration,
the average ability of the bene…ciaries of the direct employment programs should be lower.
To assess this, let zj;i be the sample average of characteristic j of the bene…ciaries of
11
program i and let sj;i be an estimate of the variance of zj;i. The variable tj;i¡k de…ned as
tj;i¡k =
zj;i ¡ zj;kp
sj;i + sj;k
is asymptotically normal.9 This simple test of equality of means tells us if a given character-
istic di¤ers among programs. Table 1 presents the equality test of all the variables for which
there is information for the FOSIS and Subsidy programs. As expected, the bene…ciaries
of the subsidy programs have (on average) one more year of schooling, are younger, mostly
males and have better monthly wages; which appear to be evidence that the participants in
subsidy programs have better marketable skills. To check this, a natural way to proceed is to
evaluate what would be the market wage of the bene…ciaries of each program and evaluate if
the distribution of this variable for the bene…ciaries of one program stochastically dominates
the distribution for the bene…ciaries of another program.
FOSIS Subsidy P-Value
Years of Schooling 9.55 10.54 0.00
Age 35.9 35.0 0.00
Percentage of Males 0.55 0.74 0.00
Wage 116,139 146,687 0.00
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Characteristics of Bene…ciaries of Di¤erent Programs. P-
value = P-value of the test of equality of means.
Figure 2 presents the empirical cumulative distribution function (e.d.f.) of the …tted
(log) wages for bene…ciaries of the Subsidy and FOSIS programs. It was obtained by …rst
9This statistic assumes that the populations of program i and k are independent.
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Figure 2: Cummulative Distribution Function of (log of) Wages
estimating a Mincer equation considering the population of CASEN and using the estimates
to forecast the wage rate of the bene…ciaries of each program considering their observed
characteristics (see Table 2).
The results show overwhelming evidence that the individuals of the subsidy program have
“better” characteristics than that of the bene…ciaries of the direct employment programs.
The empirical distribution function of the (log) wage rate for the bene…ciaries of the subsidy
program is always to the right of the distribution for the bene…ciaries of the direct employ-
ment program. First order stochastic dominance does not occur because of a few extreme
observations on the right of the distribution.10 However, it is important to recall that due
10A formal test of equality of the empirical distribution functions was conducted and the null hypothesis
was strongly rejected for all the relevant levels of the (log) wage rate.
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to the characteristics of the programs it is unlikely that bene…ciaries of the subsidy program
could be found there, as there are limits with respect to the wage rate that can be paid.
Thus, the empirical implications of the rationale of each program are in line with the
evidence. The bene…ciaries of direct employment and subsidy programs come from di¤erent
populations. The former is constituted by individuals that (on average) have lower education
and lower marketable skills.
3.2 Vulnerability
An explicitly stated objective of the EEPs is to provide employment to people that would
otherwise be unemployed. Implicitly, it is assumed that the characteristics of the employment
and the program should be able to successfully target this population. Next, we consider if
the programs in place were able to achieve this objective.
To do so we use the CASEN survey to estimate the probabilities of an individual being
employed, unemployed, or inactive (not participating in the labor force) conditional on a
vector x of characteristics. Multinomial logit models were estimated for the years 1996 and
2000. The reason for having two estimates is that the year 1996 will be considered as a
normal year and the year 2000 as a year of crisis. Once the estimates of the coe¢cients
for each year were obtained, they were used to estimate the conditional probabilities given
the x vector observed in the year 2000 (see Table 3). Thus, if the unemployment rate had
uniformly increased in the year 2000 one could claim that all the individuals were equally
14
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Figure 3: Cummulative Distribution Function of the Probability of Being Unemployed
(CASEN)
vulnerable to the referred phenomena. However, if there are some characteristics of the
individuals that make them more vulnerable to the unemployment, di¤erent implications
with respect to how to target potential participants could be devised.
Figure 3 presents the results of constructing the empirical distribution function of the
…tted probability of being unemployed in the year 2000 for several groups of individuals. As
the …gure makes evident, there is …rst order stochastic dominance of the empirical distribu-
tion of the unemployed with respect to that of the employed population. This is expected,
given that the multinomial model was estimated considering the characteristics of these in-
dividuals. If the population of each group is not chosen randomly, it is expected that the
population actually unemployed is more vulnerable to the unemployment that the employed
population. However, the interesting result arises when estimating the empirical distribution
15
function of the estimate of the probability of being unemployed for the people that said that
were participating in the direct employment programs of the time. As the distribution func-
tion of this population dominates that of the employed population that did not participate
in these programs, we conclude that they were more vulnerable to unemployment. Thus,
employment programs were able to attract participants that were more vulnerable to un-
employment than the people employed. However, notice that there is …rst order stochastic
dominance of the empirical distribution function of the actually unemployed over the e.d.f.
of the participants of the employment programs. This means that the programs did not
attract its targeted population, but did attract people less vulnerable to unemployment. In
all likelihood, this is so because the population attracted to the program were, according to
the model, more prone to be out of the labor market.
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Figure 4: Cummulative Distribution Function of the Probability of Being Inactive
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Figure 4 con…rms this claim by presenting the e.d.f. of the probability of being inactive
(out of the labor force) for the individuals that participated in FOSIS and subsidy programs.
The …gure eloquently shows that the FOSIS participants stochastically dominate the subsidy
programs participants; thus it is more likely for a FOSIS participant to be inactive.11 Thus,
given that the FOSIS participants have more in common with the direct employment par-
ticipants, the programs were more likely of having attracted people that would have, in the
absence of the program, choose to remain out of the labor force. The next section presents
further evidence in this regard.
3.3 Impacts
Typically, employment programs are evaluated using methodological devices that are in-
tended to capture what would have been the dynamics of a given variable in the absence of
the program. Evaluating the e¤ects of such counterfactuals is not an easy task. A method-
ology that appears to be popular is that of the propensity score matching (the references
present a list of documents that deal with the theoretical and empirical implementation of
the technique).
This technique follows a two step procedure: First, a discrete choice model for participat-
ing in the program is estimated and forecasted probabilities are assigned to each individual
(Table 4). Second, using the information of the individuals that participated in the program,
11Given that not all the x variables used on theestimation of the multinomial model were observed for the
FOSIS and subsidy programs participants, we imposed the avergae values of these variables for both groups.
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one selects individuals in the control group (that did not participate in the treatment) and
compares the variable(s) of interest for both populations. For this practice to be successful
one needs the discrete choice model to provide enough information to actually capture the
determinants of the decision to participate in the program. Once this is determined, it is
important to carefully choose the population in the control group. Two strategies have been
advanced in the literature. The nearest neighbor method chooses the individual in the con-
trol group that has the closest distance between its forecasted probability of participating
in the program and that of the individual that actually participated. Other methods do not
rely on an individual observation but weight their closeness using kernels.
In our case, as often occurs when evaluating direct employment programs, the binary
choice model is not able to do a very good job (in the sense that the Pseudo-R2 is 0.05 at
the individual level and 0.035 at the household level), however, it does better than models
that have been used in other studies (e.g. Aedo and Nuñez, 2001).
At any rate, using the nearest neighbor method, we estimated the impact of the program
on three variables: income, the household’s participation rate, and the household’s school
drop out rate (for the population in age of assisting to school). The …rst two variables
traditionally appear when evaluating employment programs and typically show that the net
bene…ts of the programs are much lower than the wage that the participants received. This
is due to the fact that in the counter-factual scenario there is a chance that persons that were
going to participate on the labor market may have found a job and that the presence of the
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program may have actually changed their choices with respect to participating all together.
Thus, we also included two variables that measure the e¤ects of the program on the
participation rate and drop-out rate. Table 5 shows that the average gain in income for the
participants in employment programs was roughly of 1/10 of the wage reported on Table 1.
At the same time, the participation rate of the individuals with less than 21 years increased
by 5.6% and that of individuals of more than 60 years by 5.4% as a result of the program.
Finally, the drop-out of high school and school (for individuals of less than 18 years) increased
by 1.1%. These results suggest that the bene…ts of these program may be overstated, given
that the empirical evidence shows that once an individual leaves school, it is highly unlikely
that he will return. Furthermore, even with conservative estimates to the return of schooling
(say 3% per year), the present value of foregone income due to deserting school may very
well be comparable with the modest gains estimated.12
3.4 Other Factors
An objective, explicitly stated by the public employment programs, is that it should focus its
attention in places (counties) of higher unemployment, or in places where the unemployment
rate is high or has increased the most as a consequence of the economic crisis.13 We can test
12Of course, these results do not take into account the distortionary costs that have to be incurred to
…nance these programs. As is usual in these studies, the general equilibrium implications of …nancing these
programs is ignored. Thus, at best, these results overestimate the bene…ts (underestimate the costs).
13It is possible that some places may have a level of unemployment that is usually high and relatively
stable. In such places, a high unemployment rate would be coupled with low levels of vulnerability of its
population to a crisis; given that the unemployment rates in periods of booms and crises are the same. Thus,
vulnerability to unemployment in periods of crisis can be proxied by using the change in the unemployment
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whether these objectives explicitly stated has been achieved and if there are other variables
that may be behind how bene…ciaries of the employment programs are chosen.
A simple way to do so is to consider the following model:
yi = ®+ ¯di + °vi + ±zi + µpi + ui (2)
where yi is the ratio between the number of bene…ciaries of the program and the economically
active population in district i,14 d is the unemployment rate, v is the ratio between the
unemployment rates of the years 2000 and 1996, z is the median per capita income of
district i; and p is a dummy variables that takes the value of 1 if the major of the district is
from the ruling coalition and 0 otherwise.
The last two variables control for other factors that may be behind the way in which the
bene…ciaries of the programs are chosen. The …rst is used as a proxy of another function that
these programs may have which is to be considered as aids to the income of poor households.
Thus, if the programs had a redistributive purpose attached to it, the number of bene…ciaries
should be negatively correlated with the median per capita income of the district. Finally,
the last variable captures possible determinants that have to do with political factors rather
than those explicitly stated in the programs. Table 6 presents the results of the estimation
of (2) using OLS.
rate between periods of boom and crisis.
14In Chile, electoral and administrative district are called ‘comunas’ and vary in size.
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The results clearly suggest that the way in which each program ‘chooses’ its bene…cia-
ries is di¤erent. Both, CASEN and FOSIS data-bases consider direct public employment
programs, thus their results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. That is, direct pub-
lic employment programs did not seem to choose their bene…ciaries considering either the
magnitude or vulnerability of the inhabitants of each district to the unemployment. Rather,
these programs seem to have targeted districts with lower income but not necessarily lower
unemployment. Finally, a variable that is robustly and positively correlated with the ratio
between bene…ciaries and labor force in the district is the political a¢liation of the major of
the district, which accounts for between 0.1% and 0.4% of the di¤erence (in favor of districts
where the major is a¢liated to the ruling coalition).15 Although still statistically signi…cant,
that the coe¢cient associated with p in FOSIS is 4 times smaller than that with information
from CASEN, is probably due to the fact that the bene…ciaries of FOSIS present a mixture
of individuals engaged in typical direct employment programs and participants of subsidy
programs.
Compared with the results for the subsidy program, the other two are strikingly dif-
ferent. The variables that are statistically signi…cant determinants of the bene…ciaries in
direct employment programs (median income and political a¢liation of the major) are not
relevant for the case of the subsidy programs. The only relevant variable appears to be the
unemployment level of the district. Nevertheless, its coe¢cient has the incorrect sign if we
15These magnitudes are not only statistically but also economically signi…cant given that they account for
50% of the mean of the dependent variable.
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want the program to focus on districts of high unemployment. In particular, bene…ciaries
and unemployment are negatively and robustly correlated, signaling that when the decision
to hire is left to private …rms, they seem to choose candidates of low unemployment districts,
which presumably have higher human capital or marketable skills.
The results of these regression do not change signi…cantly if di¤erent estimation strategies
are chosen. For example, given that the dependent variable is a proportion, the same speci-
…cation was estimated considering this characteristic and obtained similar results. The same
is true if Tobit models are considered. Furthermore, there is one district that is in‡uential
in the sense of having almost 5% of its economically active population as part of the direct
employment program (Tocopilla); if robust methods (as least absolute deviation) are used,
the conclusions remain. That is, bene…ciaries of direct employment programs (as a fraction
of the economically active population) are inversely related with the median income of the
district and only appear to be correlated with the political a¢liation of the major. On the
other hand, programs that subsidize hiring are not related with any of these variables, but
are negatively correlated with the unemployment rate of the district; thus, signaling that
…rms do not focus on choosing candidates from districts of high unemployment, but on the
contrary. These aggregate results suggest that di¤erent types of employment programs have
di¤erent impacts on the types of bene…ciaries they choose or are chosen by them.
It may be argued that p is statistically signi…cant because it is capturing something else;
in particular, it may be the case that districts with a major of the ruling coalition tend to
22
have poorer population where unemployment may be more important. This argument is not
valid because the results are obtained after controlling for variables that pretend to capture
the median income and the unemployment rate of the district. On the other hand, these
results may be consistent with majors in the ruling coalition that are more pro-active and
thus ask for more resources regardless of the particular situation of the district. Finally,
it may be argued that the results are contaminated by simultaneity (endogeneity). That
is, the outcome of the elections were due (in part) to the ‘investments’ made on the direct
employment programs. This observation may have some merit, but only strengthens the
argument that direct employment programs may have a political component.
4 Concluding Remarks
Social programs have been evaluated in Chile since the middle 1980s. This helped to correct
a number of problems through the change of the design, and particularly, the requisites
for participating in them. The recent employment programs presented several designs that
changed over time, re‡ecting not only the intention of the authority to improve the targeting,
but also, the lack of knowledge about the e¤ects each program.
In this paper we evaluated employment programs in their extreme versions: direct em-
ployment (with the information of CASEN and parts of FOSIS) and subsidies to private
…rms. When comparing the characteristics of the populations in each program we found, not
surprisingly, that the more decentralized market-driven program is more e¢cient in employ-
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ing relatively more productive workers, but they are less focused in the neediest. Second,
we found that vulnerability, de…ned as the probability of being unemployed, is lower in
the population belonging to the employment programs than in the unemployed population.
That is to say, the employment programs have not targeted the most vulnerable. Third,
we evaluated the impact of the programs on households, building pseudo control groups.
We found that even though direct employment programs increased the participants family
income, they are associated with an increase in the school drop-out and labor participation
rates of the young and old. Finally, we also found that the ratio of bene…ciaries to labor
force across municipalities (for direct employment programs) cannot be associated with the
economic factors such as unemployment and in cases poverty but appears to be correlated
with the political a¢liation of the major.
We can derive a number of policy implications from this diagnosis. To avoid poor target-
ing, the market driven program should be more focused allowing bene…ciaries, for instance
through a voucher system allowing them to choose the …rm where they work. Likewise, at
the municipality level, changing the way resources are allocated is simple, since the data
on unemployment, increases in unemployment and poverty by municipalities is available, it
can objectively be used to this end. A new design can also introduce requirements to avoid
and limit schooling dropouts. Finally, the introduction of several goals in the government
programs reduced their capacity to achieve better performance on what should be their main
objective. In particular, privileging small and micro …rms reduces the capacity of monitor-
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ing the performance of the program, and speci…cally, to distinguish increases in employment
from the formalization of already hired workers.
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Wage equation Coe¢cient Standard error
Schooling 0.1327 0.000107
Experience 0.0123 0.00011
Experience2 0.0001 0.000002
Male 0.1055 0.000976
I region -0.1886 0.002047
II region 0.0906 0.002012
III region -0.1575 0.002615
IV region -0.211 0.001842
V region -0.2069 0.001129
VI region -0.2112 0.001493
VII region -0.2334 0.001464
VIII region -0.2633 0.001089
IX region -0.2753 0.001604
X region -0.1935 0.001364
XI region -0.0319 0.004165
XII region 0.188 0.003201
Constant 6.6277 0.003137
Selection equation
Schooling 0.0536931 0.000127
Experience 0.0772612 0.000087
Experience2 -0.0015037 0.000001
Male 0.4510174 0.001091
Children < 15 years old -0.0474323 0.000371
Male married 0.3275119 0.001524
Head house 0.6682929 0.00127
Constant -1.569186 0.002113
Lambda -0.2239196 0.0013356
Table 2: Mincer Equation Results
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1996 2000
Unemployed
Schooling 0.0804 (0.0005) 0.0615 (0.00039)
Age 0.3015 (0.00079) 0.3093 (0.00061)
Age2 -0.0037 (0.00001) -0.0038 (0.00001)
Male 1.3458 (0.00597) 1.3268 (0.00733)
Children < 15 years -0.1415 (0.00259) 0.0191 (0.00103)
Male + children < 15 years 0.0593 (0.0034) 0.0452 (0.00136)
Married -0.9908 (0.00461) -0.9173 (0.00338)
Per capita income -0.2627 (0.0018) -0.1672 (0.00139)
Constant -8.115 (0.01488) -8.0527 (0.01326)
Employed
Schooling 0.094 (0.00022) 0.1028 (0.0022)
Age 0.418 (0.00036) 0.3906 (0.00035)
Age2 -0.005 (0.000) -0.0044 (0.000)
Male 1.805 (0.0024) 1.7043 (0.00407)
Children < 15 years -0.181 (0.00099) -0.0691 (0.00059)
Male + children < 15 years 0.278 (0.00129) 0.0513 (0.00082)
Married -0.433 (0.00189) -0.3701 (0.0018)
Per capita income -0.017 (0.00035) -0.0399 (0.00033)
Constant -8.963 (0.00684) -8.4907 (0.00762)
# observations 10,997,088 10,804,408
Pseudo R2 0.2891 0.2355
P value Chi2 0.000 0.000
Table 3: Multinomial Logit Results. Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Individual Household
I region 0.366 (0.024) 0.461 (0.025)
II region 0.345 (0.024) 0.181 (0.027)
III region 0.684 (0.025) 0.790 (0.025)
IV region 0.090 (0.023) 0.134 (0.023)
V region 0.410 (0.014) 0.408 (0.014)
VI region -0.535 (0.026) -0.604 (0.027)
VII region 0.017 (0.019) -0.055 (0.020)
VIII region -0.183 (0.015) -0.180 (0.016)
IX region 0.043 (0.020) 0.029 (0.020)
X region 0.250 (0.016) 0.194 (0.017)
XI region 0.085 (0.053) -0.149 (0.063)
XII region 0.507 (0.038) 0.584 (0.038)
Schooling [Head of household] -0.067 (0.001) -0.077 (0.001)
Male 0.591 (0.014)
Age [Head of household] 0.194 (0.002) 0.022 (0.002)
Age2 [Head of household] -0.002 (0.000) -0.0004 (0.00002)
Household size 0.082 (0.003) 0.244 (0.003)
Married -0.471 (0.010)
Head house 0.701 (0.012)
Children < 15 years 0.011 (0.007) -0.186 (0.005)
Male + children < 15 years -0.073 (0.007)
Imputable rent -4.7E-6 (4.4E-7) -1.1E-5 (5.3E-7)
Constant -9.043 (0.044) -4.620 (0.054)
# observations 10,804,408 3,832,615
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.035
P value Chi2 0.000 0.000
Table 4: Propensity Scores. Notes: [Head of household] means that the variable used at
the household level corresponds to that of the head of the household. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
Variable Impact Con…dence interval
Income 14,156 11,098 17,213
Participation rate (20 years old or less) 0.056 0.048 0.064
Participation rate (61 years old or more) 0.054 0.037 0.072
Drop out rate (17 years old or less) 0.011 0.006 0.017
Table 5: Propensity Score Matching Results
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CASEN 2000 FOSIS Subsidy
® 0.004 (0.002) 0.004 (0.001) 0.007 (0.002)
¯ -0.006 (0.020) -0.001 (0.005) -0.029 (0.014)
° 0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.003) 0.001 (0.001)
± -1.7E-8 (7.7E-9) -2.4E-8 (8.6E-9) -1.6E-10 (6.9E-9)
µ 0.004 (0.001) 0.001 (0.0005) -0.001 (0.001)
R2 [N] 0.111 [123] 0.127 [101] 0.061 [119]
Table 6: Estimation of Equation (1). Notes: R2 = Adjusted R2. [N] = Number of observa-
tions. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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